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Abstract—The popularity of Web Based Social Networks
(WBSNs) encourages their enhancement. Many WBSN data is
considered personal data and access control management plays
a key role in this regard. The point is not only to manage
access control but to determine how administration should be
performed. Based on SoNeUCONABC , an expressive usage
control model that allows fine-grained access control manage-
ment, this paper presents SoNeUCONADM , the complementary
administrative model. Based on a pair of related and popular
administrative models, the evaluation proves the completeness of
SoNeUCONADM .
Index Terms—Administrative access control model, Web Based
Social Network, revocation, delegation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Web Based Social Networks (WBSNs) users upload
huge quantity of data, some of them personal data, which are
in many cases let out of control. Controlling and carefully
managing all WBSNs data is a demanding and challenging
necessity. At a primary step, SoNeUCONABC , an expressive
usage control model that allows fine-grained access control
management along the whole usage process is proposed in
[1]. However, access control models have to describe the way
administration is performed and then, the identification and
specification of administrative tasks for SoNeUCONABC is
the following step.
Coming back to the 90’s, given the maturity of the Role
Based Access Control Model (RBAC) proposed by R. Shadu
et al. [2], its attached administrative model can be used as a
precedent in the identification of administrative tasks [3]. In
a nutshell, in RBAC, administrative permissions (analogous
to rights) are exclusively applied to administrative roles and
other permissions are applied to any other kind of roles. Then,
administrative tasks base on the assignment of users to roles;
the assignment of permissions to roles; and the assignment
of roles to roles. The initial set of administrative tasks are
summarized as follows:
• Who is the entity in charge of creating, updating and
deleting access control preferences.
• Who is the entity in charge of associating preferences
with data.
• How preferences are associated with data and data with
data owners.
Furthermore, administrative issues also involve adminis-
trative rights management. Two types of rights are distin-
guished, namely, use and administrative rights. Use rights
consist of operations performed with objects, e.g read right,
and administrative rights correspond to operations performed
over the right of objects, e.g. the right to give read right.
The management of both types of rights is essential and
delegation and revocation are remarkable operations in this
regard. Delegation focuses on granting a right to a user, while
revocation undoes the effects of delegation. In particular, weak
and strong revocation are differentiated. The former refers to
simply remove granted permissions and the latter refers to
recursively revoke permissions from those to whom the grantee
granted the permissions. Based on these rights and operations,
the following administrative tasks are added to the previous
ones:
• Who is the entity in charge of managing revocation.
• Who is the entity in charge of managing delegation.
• How weak and strong revocation is managed based on
use rights and administrative rights.
• How delegation is managed based on use rights and
administrative rights.
In the social networking field administration focuses on
managing uploaded resources like photos or videos, speci-
fied identity data (namely personal profiles) and established
access control policies. Thus, WBSN administrative tasks are
equivalent to the ones above mentioned but considering that
resources, identity data and policies are the elements at stake.
As a result, this paper presents SoNeUCONADM , an ad-
ministrative model for SoNeUCONABC . SoNeUCONADM
addresses all aforementioned tasks to promote a wider use of
SoNeUCONABC .
This paper is structured as follows. Related work is de-
scribed in Section II. Section III presents the background.
Section IV introduces administrative features, particularly,
tasks and rights. In Section V SoNeUCONADM is described.
The evaluation of the model is described in Section VI. Lastly,
conclusions and future work is outlined in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
This Section presents the analysis of 21 proposals in the
literature that address administrative issues in collaborative
environments. Note that this study is not exclusively focused
on WBSNs, but extended to collaborative environments due
to a pair of reasons. On the one hand, WBSNs manage data
which may be related to multiple users and then, they can
be pointed out as collaborative systems. On the other hand, a
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TABLE I
ADMINISTRATIVE FEATURES ANALYSIS
Proposals Administration Delegation Revocation
[25] B. Carminati et al. (2011) D
[6] A.C. Squicciarini et al. (2009) D
√∗
[24] H. Zhang et al. (2012) C
[5] M.R. Thompson et al. (2003) D
√ √
[7] A.C. Squicciarini et al. (2010) D
√∗
[8] A. Ahmad et al. (2012) D
√ √
[9] Y. Jung et al. (2013) D
√
[10] Y. Ren et al. (2011) D
[11] M. Prilla et al. (2006) D
√
[12] A. Imine et al. (2009) D
√
[13] M. Lorch et al. (2003) D
√ √
[14] H.F. Wedde et al. (2003) D
[15] R. S. Shandu et al. (2010) D
√ √
[16] R. S. Shandu et al. (2011) D
√ √
[17] W.K. Edwards (1996) C
[18] K. Sikkel et al. (1997) D
√ √
[19] Z.Y. Zhang et al. (2011) D
√ √
[20] R.K. Thomas (1997) C
[21] E. Cohen et al. (2002) D
√∗
[22] V. Gligor et al. (2002) D
√∗
[23] J. Jin et al. (2006) D
√
∗: mentioned but not managed
small amount of proposals focus on administrative issues in
the specific context of WBSNs.
In general, 6 contributions fall in the WBSN category [4],
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9], 3 proposals in document sharing [10],
[11], [12], one proposal bases on grid environments [13] and
the rest of them focus on other general collaborative systems
[14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24].
This analysis studied the administration type, namely, cen-
tralized C (a single entity decides who can get into the
systems) or decentralized D (multiple entities decide who can
get into the systems); and how delegation and revocation are
managed. Table I presents results of the analysis. Symbol *
means that a particular feature has been mentioned but not
managed.
In what concerns the administration type, 18 approaches
deal with D administration and just 3 proposals focus on
C administration. As expected, administration tends to be
decentralized because each WBSN user has to manage his
owned data.
Concerning centralized administration, in [17] a central
administrator manages roles and policies. Furthermore, the
need of dynamism is highlighted and the change of user roles,
at runtime, is an essential matter to deal with. Similarly, [20]
proposes teams management. Teams are composed of users
with the same role whose management is left to a general
administrator. Likewise, in [24] groups are managed by a
central authority in such a way that users are added to groups
and rules, based on user attributes, time periods and resource
usages, are applied to groups.
The majority of approaches base on decentralized admin-
istration, allowing users to individually manage their per-
sonal data. For instance, in [12], the administrators initiate
the administration process by notifying updates to affected
users who become involved in the administrative management
process. By contrast, in [23], [5] users who want to become
involved in a particular administrative process have to request
it. Other proposals divide data, particularly documents, among
users and they work over each owned piece of data [10].
A different solution are proposed by M.R. Thompson et al.
[5] and A. Ahmad et al [8]. M.R. Thompson et al’s work
bases on certificates jointly signed by all users involved in
the administrative process. However, A. Ahmad et al propose
transfer, multiplication and division operations [8].
Delegation, associated with decentralized administration,
is addressed in a total of 9 approaches. In collaborative
environments several users have to cooperate to achieve a
common goal. Then, delegating permissions breaks the power
of a central administrative user by sharing administrative tasks
among different parties. The most of approaches focus on
permissions delegation [15], [16], [18], [13], [5], [24], [8],
being the proposals of Z.Y. Zhang et al. and J. Jin [23] the
only ones which propose role delegation [19] and E. Cohen
et al.’s proposal which exclusively mentions the difficulty in
managing delegation in organizational environments [21].
Related to revocation management, in multiple cases users
may regret having granted a certain use or administrative right
to a user. A total of 10 proposals provide mechanisms to
deal with revocation and other 3 contributions mention the
relevance of its management [22], [6], [7]. They focus on weak
revocation in respect to rights [15], [16], [11], [13], [8] and
group memberships [12] and on strong revocation regarding
delegated rights [18], [19], [9] and certificates [5].
In sum, it is concluded that administration in collaborative
environments tends to be decentralized. This is specially re-
markable in WBSNs, where many users and data are managed.
Besides, most of analysed approaches propose revocation and
delegation mechanisms which helps to conclude the relevance
of their management as part of the administration process.
III. BACKGROUND: SoNeUCONABC
SoNeUCONABC is an expressive usage control model
that manages six WBSN features, namely, common-contacts,
clique, distance, multi-path, direction and flexible attributes
[26], [27], [28], [29].
In general, SoNeUCONABC is composed of seven ele-
ments: Subjects (S) together with Subject attributes (ATT (S))
refer to WBSN users and their attributes; Objects (O) to-
gether with Object attributes (ATT (O)) correspond to WBSN
data and their attribute; and Relationships (RT ) together
with Relationship attributes (ATT (RT )) refer to the set of
relations and attributes that exist between a pair of users,
being direct relationships denoted as E and ATT (E) their
attached attributes; Rights (R) correspond to actions that can
be performed over objects O; Authorizations (A) refer to rules
to satisfy to grant a subject a right on an object; Obligations
(B) correspond to requirements to satisfy before or while the
usage process; and Conditions (C) refer to requirements to
satisfy in regard to context features, eg. network availability.
In SoNeUCONABC , access control policies, denoted as
ρ, consist of ρ(ρs; ρo; ρrt; r; ∂b; ∂c). In particular, ρs, ρo and
ρrt are predicates defined over subject, object and relationship
attributes respectively. Besides, rights are denoted as r and
obligations and conditions refer to ∂b and ∂c respectively.
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In the following, an example of an access control policy
is presented: Access is granted to photos entitled “Party” to
friends of a friend if they are under 30 years old or if they
are under 25 years and have studied computer science.
ρ = (((age < 30) ∨ ((age < 25) ∧ (studies =
c.science))); (title = party); ((((role = friend); (role =
friend))), ∅, ∅); read; ∅; ∅)
For more details of SoNeUCONABC usage control model
see [1].
IV. TOWARDS ADMINISTRATION
Prior to the description of how administration is performed
in SoNeUCONADM , administrative tasks to address (Section
IV-A) and the available rights to manage (Section IV-B) are
detailed in the following Sections.
A. Administrative tasks
Administration involves multiple tasks (recall Section I)
which can be classified in a couple of groups regarding tasks
related to:
• The identification of who is involved in administrative
issues. These tasks refer to who manages access control
policies, who associates policies with resources and iden-
tity data and who manages revocation and delegation.
• The definition of how administrative issues are per-
formed. These tasks correspond to how policies are
associated with resources and identity data, how resources
and identity data are associated with their owners and how
revocation and delegation are managed.
B. Rights management
Two types of rights are differentiated, use rights and ad-
ministrative rights. The former ones, which are referred in
SoNeUCONUCON to as Rights (R), base on operations
performed with objects such as read, and operations carried out
over objects like tag, move or copy. By contrast, administrative
rights (AR) refer to the management of elements involved in
the access control decision process, along with delegation and
revocation management.
V. SoNeUCONADM DEFINITION
Users enrolled in a WBSN become owners of uploaded
resources, established identity data (mainly profile data) and
defined access control policies. Thus, SoNeUCONADM is
based on ownership, such that owned elements are managed
by their owners. Specifically, administrative objects (AO) cor-
respond to the elements involved in the access control decision
process, namely, managed subjects (S), objects (O), direct
relationships (E) and their respective attributes (ATT (S),
ATT (O),ATT (E)) and access control policies (ACP ).
In SoNeUCONADM , owners execute administrative rights
AR over administrative objects AO and grant use rights R
over objects O according to access control policies ACP (see
Figure 1). In this regard, following Sections describe use rights
R and administrative rights AR management (Section V-A and
V-B respectively).
Fig. 1. SoNeUCONADM
A. Use rights management
Each owner specifies as many access control policies as
desired and leaves them in a pool of policies to be evaluated
when a request is received for executing some right over one
of his owned objects. Contrary to other models, policies in
ACP are not directly associated with data and its owner but
to the owner exclusively. For instance, the policy ”grant read
access to data entitled PARTY to users older than 20” is
created, associated with an owner and located in his pool
of policies. Next, when an object of a particular owner is
requested, all policies associated with him are evaluated,
verifying authorizations (A), composed of subjects, objects
and relationship attributes and the granted right (ATT (S),
ATT (O), ATT (RT ) and r), obligations (∂b) and conditions
(∂c). If there is a policy ρi within the set of policies defined
by an owner (Powi ) that matches the request, the right r over
the requested object o is granted to the requester s. Assuming
that the expression owner(“element”) means being owner of
“element”, it is formally defined as:
(s, o, r) granted ⇐ Powi= {ρi ∈ ACP/owner(ρi) =
owner(o)}∧
∃ρi(A(ATT (S), ATT (O), ATT (RT ), r); ∂b; ∂c) ∈ Powi/
ρi(A(ATT (s), ATT (o), ATT (rt(owner(o), s)), r); ∂b; ∂c) =
true
B. Administrative rights management
This Section details the management of administrative ob-
jects (AO), revocation and delegation. In general, being owner
of a particular administrative object ao grants administrative
rights AR over it to manage the object and its attributes and
to delegate and revoke use rights R and administrative rights
AR over it. It is formally defined as:
(s, ao,management) granted⇐ s = owner(ao)
(s, ao, delegation) granted⇐ s = owner(ao)
(s, ao, revocation) granted⇐ s = owner(ao)
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1) Administrative objects management: Administrative ob-
jects AO management consists of the creation, modification
and deletion of any AO.
In terms of subjects S, they can create WBSN accounts,
becoming owners of their profiles, uploaded data and estab-
lished access control policies. Analogous, they can cancel their
accounts whenever desired.
Objects O are other topic for discussion. In general, objects
are stored in WBSN data bases, eg. Facebook. Nonetheless,
in decentralized WBSNs, like Diaspora, each user chooses the
host to store his data. Similar to WBSN accounts, objects have
to be deleted when users want.
In regard to direct relationship E (as the indirect once
are constructed through them [1]), WBSN users establish
relationships with other users, as well as they update or remove
them.
Concerning attributes, subject, objects and relationships
attributes have to be considered (ATT (S), ATT (O) and
ATT (E) respectively). Firstly, ATT (S) which basically refer
to profile data, are linked to a WBSN account and they
can be established by the account’s owner, retrieved from an
Identity Provider (IdP) where they where previously defined
or obtained from personal devices like identity cards. Second,
ATT (O) attached to an object can be defined by its owner,
as well as retrieved from the object’s metadata. Nonetheless,
if required, owners have to give permission to WBSNs to
process metadata. Finally, what concerns with ATT (E), they
are considered identity data and then, they can be defined by
owners or retrieved from IdPs.
On the other hand, access control policies can be also
created, updated or deleted, at any time. In particular, all
subjects with a WBSN account can manage access control
policies ACP .
One last point is that the use of attributes, conditions and
obligations in spite of being opened sets, depends on what
every WBSN supports.
2) Delegation management: Delegations consist of granting
permission to a certain user over a particular object tempo-
rary or permanent. The delegation of use rights R can be
analogous to the establishment of access control policies. A
right is granted to the requester over the requested object after
satisfying an access control policy.
On the contrary, the delegation of AR requires the definition
of the following function:
• DELEGATE(vk,vj ,oi,λ): It states that vk gives a specific
AR λ to vj over oi. λ refers to a partial or a complete
delegation, the former to delegate some AR and the latter
to delegate all AR. λ takes the value ∗ for a complete
delegation and takes the value, e.g., AR-R to express that
only the permission to grant use rights R is delegated.
Note that this administrative model applies permanent
delegation and the temporal one is left as a matter of
future work.
In SoNeUCONADM the delegation of AR compels the
permanent delegation of all AR. Thus, the object over which
the operation is executed, becomes property of the delegatee.
The delegation operation should be enforced such as λ takes
the value ∗, DELEGATE(vk,vj ,oi,∗).
3) Revocation management: Revocation, contrary to dele-
gation, removes the granted right over an object to a certain
user. There are two types of revocation, weak and strong
(Section I). Nonetheless, weak revocation of use rights R is
the only SoNeUCONADM manages since the delegation of
AR is permanent and recursive delegation of use rights R are
not applied.
SoNeUCONADM manages revocation in terms of the
update of attributes and access control policies, eg. if a photo
entitled “Summer” is accessible to relatives, it would remain
accessible to this set of people until the policy or the photo’s
title change. Indeed, it is extremely related to usage control
and the application of mutability and continuity attributes. Mu-
tability refers to the fact that attributes can be updated at any
time. On the other hand, continuity refers to the enforcement of
access control along the whole usage process. Both attributes
are directly related to revocation because if initial conditions
change along the usage process, access decisions have to be
taken again [30] and they may cause the revocation of granted
rights. Based on [31], revocation can be also divided between
direct and indirect:
• Direct revocation can be enforced, at any time, by the
owners of resources and identity data. Data owners may
decide to revoke rights previously granted, updating or
deleting an access control policy, as well as changing
attributes. For instance, if the right to access a photo
entitled “Classes” is granted to relationships with role
“classmates”, revocations can be caused by the update
of the title of the photo or by the update of the role
of a classmate relationship. Likewise, if the policy “
Grant access to Friends to all photos” is updated to
“Grant access to Friends to photos entitled Birthday”, it
may prevent requesters from getting requested rights in
subsequent requests or while the usage process.
In the revocation process, apart from the data owner, the
Usage Reference Monitor is the entity at stake. This entity
is composed of a Usage Decision Facility (UDF) and
a Usage Enforcement Facility (UEF) which are always
active [34] and they are applied in the usage control
process. UDF identifies changes in attributes and UEF
enforces access control accordingly. When policies are
updated or attributes are changed, the UDF is informed
about that. Afterwards, it informs the occurred event to
the UEF and lastly, the UEF enforces the re-evaluation
of policies.
• Indirect revocation is caused by uncontrolled situations.
Particularly, it is performed when access control policy at-
tributes expire or change. “Automatic” attributes updates,
either subjects, objects or relationship attributes, can
cause revocation of granting rights.“Automatic’ means
that no users interactions are required. For instance, if the
right to access a photo entitled “High-school” is granted
to users under 18, revocations occur when requesters
turn to 18 years old. Note that “automatic” updates are
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TABLE II
ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS COMPARISON
Tasks SoNeUCON ADM UCON ABC [32], [33] RBAC [3]
Entities identification
Creating, updating and deleting access con-
trol preferences
Owners. Owners. Owners.
Associating preferences to data Not required - Owners
Revocation management Usage reference monitor and owners - Owners
Delegation management Owners - Owners
Management procedures
Association between preferences with data
and data with data owners
Policies are exclusively associated to data
owners concerning subjects, objects and re-
lationships attributes.
Assertions associate subjects and objects Permissions are associated with roles and
and data and roles with data owners
Revocation management Weak revocation is managed. Attributes and
access control policies updates.
Weak revocation is managed. Time assigned
to access control policies.
Weak and strong revocation are managed.
Owners revoke users from roles according
to their decisions.
Delegation management Delegation of R and all AR is available.
Owners establish access control policies and
execute the delegation operation for all AR.
Delegation of R. Assertions associated with
particular requesters.
Delegation of R and AR is available. Own-
ers assigned users to roles to delegate.
specially related to attributes in which time is directly or
indirectly involved.
The management is equivalent to direct revocation except
for the fact that the UDF identifies updated attributes.
VI. EVALUATION
This Section presents the evaluation of SoNeUCONADM ,
the administrative model for SoNeUCONABC . It consists
of comparing the proposed model with the most challenging
and related administrative models, RBAC and UCONABC .
SoNeUCONADM is compared with RBAC administrative
model, for being one of the most mature administrative models
[35], [3], and with UCONABC administrative capabilities, for
being the model that lays the bases on the proposed one [32],
[33].
Administrative tasks, identified in Section I, are depicted
and compared in Table II, where symbol ‘-’ implies that a
particular task is not studied.
Concerning the association of data with preferences and
data with data owners, SoNeUCONADM only requires to
associate preferences (access control policies) to data. Policies
are mainly defined over subjects, objects and relationships
attributes instead of being attached to specific objects. By
contrast, UCONABC and RBAC pose more restrictive and
tedious tasks from the users point of view. In UCONABC
owners define assertions to associate subjects with objects, as
well as to associate policies (composed of assertions) with
objects [33]. However, in RBAC permissions are assigned to
roles and to objects and then, roles are assigned to users.
Delegation is also managed in all compared models, being
the SoNeUCONADM proposal the most flexible one. In
SoNeUCONADM delegating R involves the establishment
of access control policies according to subjects, objects and
relationship attributes. Moreover, the delegation of all AR
involves the execution of the operation DELEGATE to guar-
antee that, from the moment the operation is enforced, the
delegated object becomes property of the delegatee without the
possibility of undoing the operation. Conversely, delegation in
UCONABC is limited to R. It bases on specifying assertions
associated with particular requesters which base on objects and
subjects attributes [33]. On the other hand, RBAC delegates
R and AR through the association of roles to users.
Revocation is another compared task. SoNeUCONADM
manages direct and indirect revocation. The former is per-
formed by owners through the change of attributes and access
control policies. On the contrary, indirect revocation is exclu-
sively related to attributes updates, being particularly related
to attributes involving time restrictions. Nonetheless, as this
model only delegates R and all AR, just weak revocation
is at stake. Similarly, UCONABC manages weak revocation
assigning time to access control policies. Moreover, though
not described in the original model, Z. Zhang et al. proposed
a general procedure to manage weak and strong revocation
in UCONABC [36]. On the other hand, RBAC provides
functions to weakly and strongly revoke users from roles by
removing the assignment of users to roles.
In the light of the proposed analysis, SoNeUCONADM
supports all tasks an administrative model should pro-
vide and thus, their completeness is pointed out. Indeed,
SoNeUCONADM has a significant advantage, that is, pref-
erences (access control policies) are associated to users in-
stead of to objects and the burden of managing at least as
many policies as uploaded objects is avoided. Moreover, it
is noticeable that SoNeUCONADM does not manage strong
revocation because cascading delegations are not required. In
other words, this model bases on ownership and then, owners
should manage access control in regard to data their posses,
either being an entire piece of data or, when co-ownership
management takes place, a part of it.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, SoNeUCONADM , the administrative model
for SoNeUCONABC usage control model, has been pro-
posed. It supports administrative tasks concerning the iden-
tification of who is involved in administrative issues and how
they are performed. SoNeUCONADM has been assessed
against a pair of administrative access control models (RBAC
and UCONABC) to ensure that it successfully addresses all
identified administrative tasks.
In what concerns SoNeUCONADM , the main future step
is the management of temporal delegations. Moreover, its
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implementation either in a real or in a simulated environment
is expected in future work to prove the feasibility of its
implementation and the study of users satisfaction.
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